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Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) had caused multiple large health-care-
associated infections and outbreaks.[1–7] The first outbreak was identified retrospectively in a hospital 
in Zarqa, Jordan, in April 2012.[4] In that outbreak, 2 of 13 people (including 10 health-care workers 
(HCWs)) tested positive for MERS-CoV based on polymerase chain reaction.[4] Furthermore, a serologic 
study showed an attack rate of 10% among exposed HCWs and 5% among family contacts.[5] The 2013 
Al-Hasa outbreak in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia occurred in four hospitals and 21 of 23 (91%) of cases 
were health-care acquired.[1] The rate of acquisition of MERS-CoV was less than 1% among 200 exposed 
HCWs.[1] The third outbreak took place in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, in 2014 and occurred in 14 hospitals 
with a total of 128 cases.[2,3] Of 112 non-HCWs, 109 (97.3%) contracted infection within health-care 
settings.[3] Most recently on May 2015, an index case, 68-year-old male from South Korea visited many 
countries in the Middle East (Bahrain/Saudi Arabia/UAE/Qatar) and developed symptoms on 11 May 
2015 and was subsequently seen in multiple hospitals in South Korea.[6] In about 2 weeks, he sparked 
an outbreak involving 5 health-care facilities and 63 cases.[7] There were 34 cases in hospital B, 18 cases 
in hospital D, 5 cases in hospital E, and 3 cases in hospital F.[7] According to the WHO as of 19 June 
2015, the outbreak in the Republic of Korea involved 72 health-care facilities which have treated 
patients and 6 health-care facilities had nosocomial transmission.[8] The total number of cases as of 26 
June 2015 was 182 cases with 31 deaths.[9,10] The index case in this outbreak eventually was 
responsible for a total of 185 infections during a 4-week period, mainly through in-hospital 
transmission.[11] Sequence analysis of isolates from four patients representing at least four generations 
of transmission showed no evidence of changes in the virus.[11] 
HCWs in the various MERS outbreaks constituted 18% in South Korea outbreak[10] and 31% in the 
outbreaks in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.[1,12–14] In a recent review, the estimated percent of total 
symptomatic and asymptomatic HCWs who tested positive was 2%–67%.[14] There seems to be 
propensity of the MERS-CoV to be effectively transmitted within health-care facilities. The various 
factors facilitating such transmission had not been clearly elucidated except for that in all health-care 
facilities associated outbreaks; major breakdown in infection control procedures had occurred.[14] In Al-
Hasa outbreak, one patient infected 20 other people.[1] Further genomic sequence analysis showed that 
the MERS outbreak was due to more than one introduction of the virus into the outbreak.[15] In that 
outbreak, one MERS patient was linked epidemiologically to seven secondary cases.[1] In an outbreak in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, one patient contributed to 10 secondary cases.[16] In the recent outbreak in South 
Korea, of the initial 119 cases, 27 secondary cases in a single hospital were linked to the primary case 
and two secondary cases causing a second wave of the outbreak.[10] A total of 97 tertiary cases 
emerged.[10] The exact role of superspreader or a superspreading event in contributing to the different 
outbreaks is not well described. 
Implementation of effective infection control measures in health-care setting is vital for the control of 
the transmission of microorganisms. The recommendations from the US and European Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention call for the use of airborne infection isolation (AII) precautions for 
patients with suspected or confirmed MERS-CoV infection.[17,18] These recommendations rely on the 
fact that MERS is associated with high case fatality rate and the need to apply maximum 
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precautions.[19,20] The WHO recommends the use of AII precautions when dealing with high-risk 
procedures or aerosol-generating procedures only.[21] The experience from the Al-Hasa outbreak 
indicates that basic infection control measures were effective for the control of the outbreak in the 
hemodialysis unit as well as other areas of the hospital.[1] The need to have many AII rooms to 
accommodate a large number of patients puts a large burden on health-care organizations. 
Overcrowding in the in-patient areas as well as in the emergency departments create a favorable 
situation where suspected patients could potentially spread respiratory viruses to other patients. And in 
almost all documented health-care facility outbreaks, overcrowding was cited by experts as one of the 
reasons for igniting the outbreak. Unpreparedness of HCWs and under-enforcement of health-care 
facility administration of preventative measures for viral respiratory infections has also been a common 
deficiency noted. It is important for HCWs to be vigilant and to elicit any patient’s travel history every 
time they suspect MERS-CoV in countries outside the Arabian Peninsula. Effective triage system at the 
first encounter of patients with subsequent segregation of those with travel history and respiratory 
symptoms is of fundamental importance. It is also important to have systematic and effective infection 
prevention and control measures to effectively interrupt health-care transmissions.[22] To prevent 
intrahospital transmission of MERS-CoV infection, the Saudi Ministry of health implemented a set of 
prevention and control measures.[23] These measures included intensive education and training for 
HCWs in infection control and new standards for the surveillance and reporting of MERS-CoV.[23] Once 
a case of MERS-CoV is confirmed in a health-care facility, comprehensive contact tracing, extensive 
testing and follow up of all contacts, and quarantine/furlough of suspected HCWs, patients, visitors, and 
immediate family contacts are paramount for preventing any outbreaks from starting and spreading. 
Specific patient characteristics leading to effective transmission of MERS-CoV to multiple secondary 
cases were not elucidated. A study from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 2012–2013 utilizing 
nasopharyngeal swabs to screen 1695 HCWs contacts of MERS-CoV cases showed that 19 (1.1%) of the 
HCWs were positive for MERS-CoV by PCR.[24] The role of asymptomatic patients in the transmission of 
MERS-CoV was suggested. An asymptomatic HCW had positive PCR nasopharyngeal swab for MERS-CoV 
for about 6°weeks.[25] Further to this study, a large serological study of 10,000 blood samples in Saudi 
Arabia showed a positive MERS-CoV rate of 0.15% in the general population, 2.3% among camel 
shepherds, and 3.6% among slaughterhouse workers.[26] Those individuals who had asymptomatic or 
only mild MERS-CoV infections might act as vehicles to transmit the disease to others.[26] 
To date, the contributing factors facilitating the spread and control of MERS-CoV within health-care 
settings are poorly elucidated. Multiple outbreaks within health-care settings are attributed to poor 
compliance with the basic infection control measures. Thus, proper infection control measures and 
practice would prevent the transmission of MERS-CoV within health-care settings.[13] To prevent spread 
of MERS-CoV within health-care settings, it is important to eliminate practice variation by adopting a 
respiratory screening program and to practice the best available infection control measures. Risk 
assessment and training of all HCWs on recognizing, isolating, and cohorting possible cases are of great 
importance to further decrease transmissions within the health-care facilities. 
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